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LYING ON THE STAND WON'T COST YOU A DIME:
SHOULD COURTS RECOGNIZE A CIVIL ACTION IN
TORT FOR PERJURY?
American courts generally do not permit a person to maintain a civil
action for damages caused by another person's perjury.' Although perjury
may have a substantial adverse effect upon civil and criminal litigants,
public policies established at common law militate against a civil recovery
for damages caused by false testimony.2 Courts justify the rule against civil
actions for perjury by recognizing that the rule encourages witnesses to
speak freely in court by protecting witnesses from subsequent law suits
alleging perjury.3 Courts also justify the rule by recognizing that the rule
1. See, e.g., Liddell v. Smith, 345 F. 2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1965) (no civil action lies
in tort for perjury); Morgan v. Graham, 228 F.2d 625, 627 (10th Cir. 1956) (unsuccessful
litigant, who had lost his case because of perjured testimony, could not maintain civil action
for damages against person who committed perjury); Rudow v. City of New York, 642 F.
Supp. 1456, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing common law doctrine that makes parties to
judicial proceedings immune from subsequent civil liability for perjured testimony); Stevens v.
Brown, 564 F. Supp. 368, 370 (C.D.N.C. 1983) (no liability for damages based on subornation
for perjury in criminal case); Alberta Gas Chemicals, Ltd. v. Celanese Corp. 497 F. Supp.
637, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same), rev'd, 650 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand, 529 F. Supp.
226 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1981) (unpublished decision), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 580 (1982). See generally, Eagle, Civil Remedies for Perjury: A Proposal
for a Tort Action, 19 Amuz. L. REv. 349, 349-52 (1977) (no civil action lies in tort for perjury
or conspiracy to commit perjury in any phase of judicial proceeding).
2. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (defining elements
of criminal offense of perjury). Perjury is the most serious offense against the integrity of
information on which the government relies to convict a criminal. Id. at comment 1. False
statements affecting the outcome of a proceeding may jeopardize the determination of guilt
in a criminal trial or the adjudication of interest in a civil trial. Id. Despite the seriousness of
the offense, the common law rule against civil actions for perjury protects a perjurer from
civil liability. See supra note I (courts following common law rule against civil actions for
perjury); infra note 20 and accompanying text (same); see also notes 71-109 and accompanying
text (discussing underlying justifications for common law rule against civil actions for perjury).
3. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Epps, 179 Ga. App. 685, 686, 347 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1986)
(rule against civil actions for perjury prevents parties from intimidating witnesses with threats
of liability); Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 1984) (providing
parties, witnesses, and counsel with absolute immunity from civil liability regarding relevant
testimony in course of lawsuit); Stolte v. Blackstone, 213 Neb. 113, -, 328 N.W.2d 462,
463 (1982) (courts need to protect witnesses against fear of subsequent actions for perjury);
see generally Note, The Rule Against Civil Actions For Perjury in Administrative Proceedings:
A Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1209, 1211 (1983). The rule against civil
actions in tort for perjury encourages witnesses to speak freely in court by protecting the
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encourages the finality of judgments by preventing repeated litigation be-
tween the same parties concerning the same subject of controversy.4 Courts
suggest that the threats of frivolous perjury suits and attempts at intimidating
witnesses outweigh the benefits of a private civil action for perjury.5 Courts,
therefore, have limited a victim's remedies to either a vacation of the civil
judgment under Rule 60(b) or a collateral attack of a criminal conviction.6
The recent decision of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Copeland v.
Anderson7, however, recognized a civil action for damages caused by
perjuryA The Copeland case raises the novel question of whether courts
denying a civil action for perjury provide adequate redress for the civil
injuries that the commission of perjury inflicts and, if not, whether courts
should recognize a civil action in tort for perjury. 9
The rule that no civil action exists in tort for perjury or conspiracy to
commit perjury originated in the English common law nearly 400 years
ago.'0 In the English case of Damport v. Sympson," a plaintiff sought to
recover damages against a witness who had testified in an earlier case that
involved the misappropriation of a silver water fountain. 2 The plaintiff
witnesses from subsequent civil actions for perjury.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 588
(1977) (discussing witness immunity rule in judicial proceeding). Section 588 of the Restatement
(2d) of Torts provides an absolute privilege to witnesses testifying in a judicial proceeding. Id.
Because the function of witnesses is of fundamental importance to the administration of
justice, public policy necessitates that litigants should not undermine the full disclosure of the
truth by threatening private suits against witnesses. Id.
4. See John Allan Co. v. Brandow, 207 N.E.2d 339, 342 (11. App. 1965) (rule against
civil actions for perjury prevents retrying of every case in which prevailing party allegedly
secured judgment by perjury); Hokanson v. Lichtor, 5 Kan.App.2d 802, -, 626 P.2d 214,
222 (1981) (subsequent civil actions for perjury would relitigate same issue in original case);
Newin Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 37 N.Y.2d 211, 217, 333 N.E.2d 163,
166, 371 N.Y.S.2d 884, 889 (1975) (permitting civil actions for perjury would produce endless
litigation). See also supra note 3, at 1211-12 (sugesting that allowing civil actions for perjury
would tempt every losing party to bring similar action).
5. See infra notes 80 & 94 and accompanying text (cases that support rule against civil
action for perjury because courts fear that litigants will initiate frivolous suits and produce
endless litigation); note 101 and accompanying text (courts citing public policy of encouraging
witnesses to testify and need to prevent litigants, from intimidating witnesses to support common
law rule against civil actions for perjury).
6. See Shepherd v. Epps, 179 Ga. App. 685, 686, 347 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1986) (injured
party's remedy against judgment obtained by perjury is instituting direct attack upon previous
judgment, not civil action against alleged perjurer).
7. 707 P.2d. 560 (Okl. 1985).
8. Copeland v. Anderson, 707 P.2d 560, 563 (Okla. 1985); see infra notes 33-50 and
accompanying text (discussing decision of Oklahoma Supreme Court in Copeland to recognize
civil lability for tort of perjury).
9. Copeland, 707 P.2d at 566.
10. See Gordon, The Invention of a Common Law Crime: Perjury and the Elizabethan
Courts 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 156-58 (1980) (discussing Damport v. Sympson and origins of
common law rule against civil actions for perjury); Eagle, supra note 1, at 365 (citing Damport
and birth of common law preclusion of civil action for perjury); infra text accompanying
notes 11-19 (discussing Damport and common law rule against perjury).
11. 78 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1596).
12. Id. at 769.
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alleged that the witness gave false testimony regarding the fountain's value,
resulting in a judgment of only L200 against the defendant instead of the
fountain's actual value of L500.' 3 The plaintiff subsequently obtained a
lower court judgment of L300 in damages for the witness' perjury. 4 On
appeal, however, the Damport court reversed the plaintiff's judgment for
L300 against the witness and held that the plaintiff could not maintain a
perjury action for damages against the witness." The Damport court rea-
soned that a court might punish a defendant twice, by a civil action for
damages and a criminal action for perjury.' 6 To avoid punishing a defendant
twice, the Damport court declared that courts should punish perjurers only
by criminal actions.' 7 The Damport court also reasoned that a civil action
would discourage witnesses from testifying in court, and that no precedent
existed for a civil action for perjury.' 8 Accordingly, the Damport court
dismissed the plaintiff's action.' 9
American courts uniformly have followed the English common law rule
against civil actions for perjury. 20 For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals
recently addressed the issue of whether Georgia recognized a civil action in
tort for damages that a party sustains because of perjury. 21 In Shepherd v.
Epps2 the plaintiff brought a civil action in tort against a witness based on
the witness' alleged commission of perjury in a previous divorce proceeding.
23








20. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Epps, 179 Ga. App. 685, 686, 347 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1986)
(following common law rule that losing party in civil action cannot maintain tort action against
witness in civil action); Lawson v. Hensley, 712 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Ky. App. 1986)(discussing
common law rule that denies plaintiff right to recover compensatory damages for tort of
perjury); Hawkins v. Webster, 337 S.E.2d 682, 684 (N.C App.1985) (declaring that no civil
action exists for perjury); see also Eagle, supra note 1, at 349. American courts remain true
to the rule against civil actions for perjury with virtual unanimity and give undue weight to
the existence of precedent. Id.
21. See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text (discussing decision of Georgia court
to follow common law rule against civil action for perjury).
22. 179 Ga.App. 685, 347 S.E.2d 289 (1986).
23. Id. at 686, 347 S.E.2d at 289; see Shepherd v. Shepherd 233 Ga. 228, 229, 210
S.E.2d 731, 732 (1974) (prior divorce proceeding in which defendant witness allegedly committed
perjury). In Shepherd v. Shepherd, the plaintiff claimed that his wife's previous common law
marriage to the defendant witness voided the couple's present marriage. Shepherd v. Shepherd,
233 Ga. 228, 229, 210 S.E.2d 731, 732. Because the previous common law marriage voided
the present marriage, the plaintiff argued that he should not have to pay alimony to his wife.
Id. The wife's alleged common law husband, Mr. Epps, testified under oath, however, that
he and the plaintiff's wife had never consummated a common law marriage. Id. Based upon
the testimony of Mr Epps, the Georgia Supreme Court ordered that the plaintiff must pay his
wife alimony. Id. at 232, 210 S.E. at 734.
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caused the court to grant his wife alimony that she did not deserve. 24 The
trial court, however, granted the defendant witness' motion for summary
judgment finding that no cause of action existed in tort for perjury.25 The
plaintiff appealed the adverse summary judgment order.
26
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that Georgia courts
never had determined whether a viable claim exists for the alleged commis-
sion of perjury in a previous civil action.27 Following other jurisdictions
that had addressed the issue, the Shepherd court determined that a civil
action for perjury would not lie against either the adverse party or a witness
in a previous suit.2 The Shepherd court noted that a civil action for
damages would intimidate witnesses and create endless litigation.29 The
Shepherd court declared that the proper remedy for judgments based upon
perjured testimony is for the injured party to institute a direct attack on
the judgment rather than a collateral attack against the alleged perjurer.30
Accordingly, the Shepherd court held that the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
3
1
Unlike the Georgia Supreme Court in Shepherd, the Oklahoma Court
of Appeals in Copeland v Anderson32 determined that civil liability is
avalilable in Oklahoma for the tort of perjury.3 In Copeland the plaintiff
24. Shepherd, 179 Ga.App. at 685, 347 S.E.2d at 289. In Shepherd, the plaintiff alleged
that had the defendant witness testified truthfully about his previous common law marriage




28. Id. at 686, 347 S.E.2d at 290. The Shepherd court cited as precedent a North
Carolina case in which the court stated that no civil action existed for perjury. Id.; see Brewer
v. Carolina Coach Co., 253 N.C. 257, 261, 116 S.E.2d 725, 727-28 (1960) (holding that no
civil liability exists for perjury in North Carolina).
29. Shepherd, 179 Ga. App. at 686, 347 S.E.2d at 290. The Shepherd court stated that
a civil action in tort would permit parties to multiply and extend litigation by having courts
re-examine the previous action. Id. The Shepherd court also stated that adverse parties could
intimidate the witness by threatening to subject a witness to the expense and annoyance of a
lawsuit based on the witness' testimony. Id. See Brewer v. Carolina Coach Co., 253 N.C. 257,
261, 116 S.E.2d 725, 727-28 (1960) (suggesting that civil action for perjury would give litigants
great leverage to intimidate witnesses).
30. Shepherd, 179 Ga. App. at 686, 347 S.E.2d at 290. The Shepherd court stated that
a plaintiff may attack collaterally a judgment that is void on its face. Id. Because the alleged
perjury in the previous case would not render the judgment void on its face, the Shepherd
court held that the plaintiff's remedy was a direct attack rather than a collateral attack on
the judgment. Id.; see GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-60 (1981) (statutory provision that describes
available relief from an adverse judgment). A plaintiff directly attacks a judgment by a motion
for a new trial, a motion to set aside the judgment, or by a complaint in equity. GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-60 (1981).
31. Shepherd, 179 Ga.App. at 686, 347 S.E.2d at 290. The Georgia Supreme Court in
Shepherd adopted as law in Georgia the common law rule against civil actions in tort for
perjury. Id.
32. 707 P.2d 560 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985).
33. Copeland v. Anderson, 707 P.2d 560, 568; see infra notes 34-49 and accompanying
text (Oklahoma Court of Appeals establishing tort of perjury in Oklahoma).
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claimed that her former husband's perjured testimony during a divorce
proceeding concealed his true earning capacity and, therefore, reduced the
plaintiff's award for child support, alimony, and the plaintiff's share in the
marital estate.34 The plaintiff's complaint sought damages caused by the
defendant's perjury and deceit, a vacation of the divorce decree, and also
requested punitive damages.3 5 The trial court determined that under Okla-
homa law the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which the
court could grant relief.16 Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint.3 7 Subsequently, the plaintiff appealed to the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals."
In determining whether Oklahoma law permits a civil action for perjury,
the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Copeland held that perjury is a form
of the tort of deceit.3 9 The Copeland court determined that to create liability
the plaintiff must prove that the perjurious statement constituted deceit
under Oklahoma law.4° According to the Copeland court to establish a tort
of deceit under Oklahoma law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a party
intentionally deceived the plaintiff and that the plaintiff relied to his
detriment on the deception. 41 The Copeland court noted that because a
perjuring witness makes a material misrepresentation that the witness knows
is false, the essential elements for the tort of perjury should parallel the
elements for the tort of deceit. 42 The Copeland court declared that to
establish the tort of perjury a plaintiff must show that the witness willfully
deceived another, such as a litigant, juror, or investigator, with the intent
34. Copeland, 707 P.2d at 562. In Copeland v. Anderson the plaintiff alleged that her
former husband had concealed negotiations with his employer, the McDonald's hamburger
chain. Id. The plaintiff contended that testimony regarding the negotiations with McDonald's
would have had a direct effect on the truthfulness of her former husband's earning capacity
because the negotiations would have revealed the husband's plan to acquire an interest in a
McDonald's franchise. Id.
35. Id. In Copeland, the plaintiff alleged that had the defendant accurately disclosed his
earning capacity, the plaintiff's award would have been $150,000 greater. Id. The plaintiff,
therefore, sought the $150,000 as compensatory damages. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff sought
$500,000 in punitive damages. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 562-63.
39. Id. at 563. The Copeland court noted that perjury is a crime in Oklahoma. Id. The
Oklahoma state statute defined the crime of perjury as the willfull making of a false statement
under oath. Id; see OKLA. STAT. 21 § 491 (1981) (statutory provision defining criminal offense
of perjury).
40. Copeland, 707 P.2d at 564. The Copeland court stated that when a witness has given
deceptive trial testimony, the witness has intended to defraud the opposing party who subse-
quently received an adverse judgment due to the false testimony. Id.; see OKx. STAT. 76 § 4
(1981) (defining deceit under Oklahoma law). The Oklahoma deceit statute provides that a
person who has deceived another with the intent to defraud, also has intended to defraud
every individual who the person actually misleads by the deceit. OKIA. STAT. 76 § 4 (1981).
41. Copeland, 707 P.2d at 564.
42. Id.
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to make him alter his position. 43 The Copeland court held that the plaintiff
also must demonstrate that he suffered detriment from the defendant
witness' deception upon the trier of fact.44 The Copeland court concluded
that if a plaintiff could demonstrate detriment caused by the defendant
witness in the prior action, the defendant should compensate the injured
party.
4 5
Although recognizing a civil remedy for the tort of perjury, the Okla-
homa Court of Appeals in Copeland declared that a plaintiff must prove
that the perjured testimony was a material misrepresentation to establish
the tort." The Copeland court defined a material misrepresentation as one
that is so substantial that the misrepresentation significantly affects or
influences the party to whom it is made. 47 Measured against the definition
of material misrepresentation, the Copeland court determined that the
husband's unrealized business opportunity was speculative and, therefore,
not material.4" Accordingly, the Copeland court held that the plaintiff failed
to state a cause of action under the new tort of perjury, and affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim.49
Although Oklahoma is the first state to recognize a common law tort
for perjury, one state statutorily allows a civil action for perjury ° A Maine
statute provides that a party, injured by the perjury of an adverse party or
a witness that the adverse party introduced at trial, may recover damages
proximately caused by the perjury. 51 The Maine statute also provides that
the plaintiff may bring an action in tort and may recover damages only for
43. Id. at 563-64.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 568-69.
47. Id. at 569. Before establishing whether the defendant's statement constituted a
material misrepresentation, the Copeland court stated that the court would have to determine
that the plaintiff would have received a larger share of the marital estate had the court known
the truth. Id.
48. Id. While recognizing that the defendant's unrealized business opportunity could
have had a beneficial effect on the defendant's future income, the Copeland court determined
that the business opportunity was relevant only to the issue of support, and not to the division
of marital assets. Id.
49. Id. The Copeland court also found that the plaintiff's allegation of the facts did not
support a vacation or modification of the divorce decree. Id. at 570.
50. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing Maine's statutory cause of
action for perjury).
51. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 14 § 870 (1964 & Supp.) (statute providing civil action in
tort for perjury). The Maine statute allows a plaintiff to bring an action for damages against
the adverse party, or any alleged perjurious witness or confederate in the alleged perjury. Id.;
see also Cole v. Chellis, 122 Me. 262, -, 119 A. 623, 623 (1923) (permitting injured party
to bring civil action against witness who committed perjury). In Cole v. Chellis, the District
Court for the District of Maine declared that to obtain a judgment for the plaintiff due to
the perjured testimony of a witness, the plaintiff must prove that he suffered damages from
the perjured testimony. Cole, 112 Me. at -, 119 A. at 623.
[Vol. 44:1257
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the perjury of an adverse party or a witness that the adverse party introduced
at trial but not against a plaintiff's own witness.
5 2
A recent decision by the United States District Court of Maine applied
Maine's statute that permits a plaintiff to bring a civil action to recover
damages arising out of a judgment allegedly based on false testimony.53 In
Spickler v. Dube,14 the plaintiff was unable to sell recently developed land
because the defendant refused to release the mortgages on the property.
5
At a subsequent trial for breach of contract and default, the defendant
introduced an allegedly false demand letter and testified that the plaintiff
had executed the note.56 The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had
defaulted on the plaintiff's mortgage payments.5 7 The plaintiff argued,
however, that he had never seen the fabricated demand letter and, therefore,
that he was not in default .5  The jury found for the defendant on both
claims.59 The plaintiff subsequently filed an action in the District Court for
the District of Maine against the defendant and his attorneys for damages
proximately caused by the perjured testimony and the allegedly fabricated
document.6 Neither the plaintiff nor the district court, however, mentioned
the Maine statute in the proceeding. 6' The district court, therefore, held
that an independent action does not lie to recover damages arising out of
a judgment allegedly tainted by false testimony and dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint. 62 The plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal.
63
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
remanded the case to the district court. 64 The First Circuit directed the
district court to apply the Maine statute that provides a civil action for the
tort of perjury.65 On remand, the district court declared that if a plaintiff
52. ME. REv. STAT. ANN 14 § 870 (1964 & Supp. 1986) (permitting plaintiff to bring
perjury action only against adverse party or witness introduced by adverse party).
53. See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text (federal district court applying Maine
statute).
54. 626 F. Supp. 1092 (D.Me. 1986).
55. Spickler v. Dube, 626 F.Supp. 1092, 1093 (D.Me. 1986); see Spickler v. Dube, 463
A.2d 739 (Me. 1983) (court discussing facts of case). In Spickler v. Dube, the plaintiff paid
$30,000 cash downpayment on undeveloped real estate and executed four notes to finance the
remaining $270,000 of the purchase price. Spickler, 463 A.2d at 740. The plaintiff secured
each note by executing mortgages on different parcels of the land. Id. After the plaintiff had
developed the land, several buyers became interested in purchasing the property. Id. When the
defendant learned of the pending sale of the property, the defendant refused to release the
mortgages on the land. Id.
56. Spickler, 463 A.2d at 739.
57. Spickler, 626 F. Supp. at 1093.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1092.
61. Id. at 1095.
62. Id. at 1092.
63. Id.
64. See Spickler v. Dube, 774 F.2d 1149 (lst Cir. 1985) (unpublished opinion in which
United States Court of Appeals for First Circuit remanded case to district court).
65. Spickler, 626 F.Supp at 1092.
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alleged in his complaint that he incurred damages due to a judgment
obtained by perjury, the plaintiff properly stated a cause of action under
the Maine statute.6 6 Accordingly, the district court reversed the lower court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's claim and held that the plaintiff could maintain
a civil action for perjury under the Maine statute.6 7
Aside from the Oklahoma Supreme Court and courts construing the
Maine statute, other courts consistently have refused to recognize a civil
action for perjury.6 8 In refusing to permit civil actions in tort for perjury,
however, courts have honored the common law rule against civil actions
for perjury without discussing the validity of the policies supporting the
decision to reject a civil action.69 The absence of explanations concerning
whether courts should permit civil actions for perjury necessitates an ex-
amination of the common law rule in light of the justifications underlying
the denial of a civil remedy for false testimony.70
A repeated justification for the rule denying civil liability for perjury is
that criminal statutes against perjury sufficiently deter witnesses from giving
false testimony.71 Nevertheless, the number of perjury cases demonstrates
that perjury still exists.72 To deter perjury, state legislatures have enacted
statutes that generally consider perjury a felony punishable by imprison-
66. See id. at 1095 (acknowledging possibility of civil action for perjury under Maine
statute). The Spickler court originally relied on a Maine case decided before the Maine
legislature had enacted the statute that provides a civil action for perjury. Id. The district
court in the earlier case had held that a plaintiff could not bring an independent action for
damages allegedly caused by an adverse witness' false testimony. Id.; see Dunlop v. Glidden,
31 Me. 435, 437 (1850) (earlier Maine case stating that no civil action exists for tort of perjury
in Maine).
67. Spickler, 626 F.Supp. at 1092.
68. See supra notes 1 & 20 and accompanying text (court decisions holding that no civil
liability exists for perjury).
69. See, e.g., Lawson v. Hensley, 712 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Ky.App.1986) (citing general
rule against civil action for perjury without discussing justifications for rule or applicability
of rule to facts of case); Stolte v. Blackstone, 213 Neb. 113, -, 328 N.W.2d 462, 463
(Neb. 1982) (court following majority rule against civil actions for perjury without discussing
justifications underlying rule); Hawkins v. Webster, 337 S.E.2d 682, 684 (N.C.App. 1985)
(dismissing complaint without explaining policy behind rule against civil actions for perjury).
70. See infra notes 71-109 and accompanying text (discussing justifications for denying
civil remedy for perjury).
71. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Perjury is the
willful giving of false testimony in a judicial proceeding on a material point by a witness who
has taken an oath to tell the truth. Id. Perjury may occur whenever a witness makes a false
statement under oath in a trial, deposition, declaration, or affidavit, when accompanied by
an intent to publish the material as true. Id.; see Eagle, supra note 1, at 350-52 (discussing
need for more effective deterrents to perjury that ensure integrity of judicial proceedings).
Commentators have suggested that an urgent need exists to reform perjury laws and emphasize
the need for increased prosecution. Eagle, supra note 1, at 351.; infra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text (discussing criminal statutes against perjury).
72. Cf. Eagle, supra note 1, at 351 (declaring that criminal laws against perjury are
small obstacle to individual contemplating perjury).
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ment. 7a Courts have determined that subjecting a defendant to both criminal
prosecution and civil liability for perjury punishes the witness for the same
offense twice.74 Courts, however, have never used the double punishment
theory as a ground for denying civil redress for other intentional wrongs.75
For example, assault, battery, libel, embezzlement, and other intentional
wrongs are offenses that inflict personal injuries for which a plaintiff may
recover both punitive and compensatory damages and are also offenses that
subject a defendant to both civil and criminal penalties. 76 The deterrent
effect that criminal statutes provide by punishing intentional wrongs, how-
ever, has never been a basis for courts to refuse civil relief." Refusing to
grant civil relief to plaintiffs injured by perjured testimony because the
wrongful act also may subject defendants to criminal penalties, therefore,
is not a persuasive justification for the refusal of a tort recovery.78 Accord-
ingly, courts should permit tort recovery from a person who commits perjury
that causes an unjustified intentional injury.
79
A second justification underlying judicial refusals of a civil action for
the tort of perjury is the public's interest in the finality of judgments.
80
73. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 523.020 (Repl.Vol. 1985) (perjury in first degree is class
D felony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-5-605 (Repl.Vol. 1982) (perjury punishable as felony); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-434 (1950 Repl.Vol. 1982)(perjury punishable as class 5 felony); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) Comment 1. States usually grade perjury as a felony and
sometimes punish the offense with penalties that are more severe than the offense. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) Comment 1.
74. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Webster, 337 S.E.2d 682, 684 n. 1 (N.C. 1985) (availability
of criminal sanctions precludes civil action in tort for perjury); Copeland v. Anderson, 707
P.2d 560, 566 (Okla. 1985) (discussing double punishment as basis for denying civil redress
for perjury); Damport v. Sympson, 78 Eng. Rep 769, 769 (K.B. 1596) (early English case
establishing rule that allowing civil action for perjury would punish defendant twice); see also
supra text accompanying notes 10-19 (discussing Damport).
75. See Copeland v. Anderson, 707 P.2d 560, 567 (Okla. App. 1985) (discussing Damport
court's concern that courts permitting civil redress might punish defendant twice). The Copeland
court noted that no court has ever denied civil relief for an intentional tort other than perjury
because the wrongful act also was a crime. Id.
76. See generally W. KEETON, D. DoBas, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEaToN
ON TORTS, 7-15 (5th ed. 1984). The same intentional act may be both a crime against the state
and a tort against an individual. Id. at 8. A court may hear a civil tort action and a criminal
prosecution for the same offense. Id.
77. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 365-66. A civil action for the tort of perjury would not
interfere necessarily with the government's right to prosecute in a criminal action. Id at 366.
Instead, civil liability for perjury may provide an additional deterrent against the commission
of perjury. Id. at 365, n. 111.
78. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing validity of double punish-
ment theory as justification for denying civil liability for perjury).
79. See id. (notes discussing validity of double punishment theory).
80. See Alberta Gas Chemicals, Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 497 F.Supp. 637, 639 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (explaining that rule against civil actions for perjury is necessary to prevent parties from
endlessly relitigating matters), rev'd, 650 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand, 529 F. Supp. 226
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1981) (unpublished decision), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 580 (1982); Shepherd v. Epps, 179 Ga. 685, 686, 347 S.E.2d 289, 290 (Ga.App.
1986)(stating that civil action for perjury would multiply and extend litigation if parties could
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The ability to maintain an action for perjury potentially would allow every
losing party the opportunity to bring a perjury action against the winning
party in each subsequent lawsuit."s The potentially endless litigation arguably
would conflict with the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and
their goal of finality of judgments.82 Res judicata bars a subsequent suit
between the same parties if the same parties seek to relitigate the subject
matter of a previous cause of action. 3 Alternatively, res judicata prohibits
the splitting of a claim. 4 Essential to the application of res judicata,
therefore, is an attempt to relitigate the same claim. 5 Courts, however,
should not apply res judicata to bar litigation of a claim against a witness
or a defendant to the original action who consciously introduces perjured
testimony because the perjury claim against the witness or a defendant in
the original action usually is unrelated to the original claim. 6 Because a
claim alleging the commission of perjury is usually not part of the same
transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the initial suit, a civil action for
the tort of perjury rarely would violate the doctrine of res judicata.17
Collateral estoppel, a doctrine similar to res judicata, prevents relitigation
of any issue necessarily decided in a previous action.8 For example, if the
re-examine subject matter of previous action with new action between victim and alleged
perjurer); see also Eagle, supra note 1, at 368-71 (suggesting that liberalizing rule against civil
actions for perjury could conflict with finality of judgments).
81. See Note, supra note 3, at 1212 (rule against civil actions for perjury reflects fear
by courts that civil actions would tempt every losing party to bring perjury action).
82. See id. at 1210-14 (discussing doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in
context of civil actions for perjury); Eagle, supra note 1, at 369-71 (applying doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel to civil actions for perjury); see infra notes 83-92 and
accompanying text (discussing res judicata and collateral estoppel).
83. See M. GRENN, BAsic CrVIL PROCEDURE, 227-34 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing doctrine
of res judicata). A plaintiff who sues a defendant seeks to establish and enforce a cause of
action. Id. at 228. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment is conclusive upon the
parties in any subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action. Id. at 227. The
judgment has the effect of extinguishing the cause of action. Id. at 228.; see Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90 (1980) (explaining doctrine of res judicata). In Allen v. McCurry, the United
States Supreme Court declared that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that the parties could have or did raise in the
original action. Allen v. McCurry, 49 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
84. M. GREEN, supra note 83, at 228. The doctrine of res judicata precludes a plaintiff
from splitting his cause of action. Id. A splitting of a cause of action occurs if a plaintiff
divides a single or indivisible cause of action into several claims and brings several actions
based on these different claims. Id.
85. See id. (discussing doctrine of res judicata). 'In res judicata the first judgment is
conclusive, not only on all matters that the plaintiff actually litigated, but on all matters that
the plaintiff could have litigated. Id.
86. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 370 (commentator discussing application of res judicata
to civil action in tort for perjury). Courts should not apply res judicata to bar litigation of a
claim that on a specific instance the defendant perjured his testimony. Id.
87. See Id., at 369-70 (applying res judicata to civil actions for perjury). A fundamental
goal of res judicata is to prevent the relitigation of a single cause of action. Id. at 369. Courts
seldom consider a perjury claim as part of the same transaction that gave rise to the initial
suit. Id.,
88. See M. GREEN, supra note 83, at 234-41 (discussing doctrine of collateral estoppel).
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parties in the original action litigated fully and fairly the truthfulness of a
particular witness' testimony, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel would
bar a plaintiff's subsequent tort claim for perjury against the witness. 9
Although the trier of fact in the original action may evaluate the truthfulness
of all the testimony, the parties usually do not litigate in the original action
the honesty of a particular witness or party.9 The doctrine of collateral
estoppel should bar an action in tort for perjury only when the trier of fact
has determined that the witness has perjured himself in the prior action. 9'
Allowing a plaintiff a civil action for the tort of perjury, therefore, rarely
conflicts with either the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel and
should not prevent courts from recognizing civil liability for perjury.92
A third justification for the rule prohibiting civil actions for perjury is
closely related to the goal of finality. 93 Opponents of a civil action for
perjury argue that permitting civil actions for perjury would result in a
flood of litigation. 94 Maine, the one state that has enacted a statute that
allows a recovery of damages for perjury, however, has not experienced a
significant increase in perjury litigation. 95 Arguably, the statute's high stand-
ard of proof has deterred frivolous lawsuits. 96 Similarly, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's requirement in Copeland that a plaintiff in a civil action
Collateral estoppel precludes a party in a second suit from litigating any issue that was
necessary to the decision in a prior case. Id. at 235.; see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980)(explaining doctrine of collateral estoppel). The Supreme Court in Allen stated that under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, if a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to
the court's judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a
different cause of action involving a party to the first case. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.
89. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 370 (discussing application of collateral estoppel to civil
actions for perjury). In most cases, the parties do not litigate the veracity of a particular
witness or even an adverse party in the original action. Id.
90. See id. (parties may not relitigate fact necessarily decided in previous cause of action).
91. See id. at 371 (applying collateral estoppel to civil actions in tort for perjury).
Collateral estoppel should bar an action in tort only in cases in which the factfinder distinctly
adjudged the veracity of the witness that the plaintiff alleges perjured testimony. Id.
92. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (noting that civil action for perjury
rarely conflicts with either doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel).
93. See, e.g., John Allan Co. v. Brandow, 207 N.E.2d 339, 342 (Ill.App. 1965) (rule
against civil action for perjury prevents retrying of every case in which plaintiff alleges that
adverse party obtained judgment by false testimony or documents); Stolte v. Blackstone, 213
Neb. 113, -, 328 N.W.2d 462, 463 (Neb. 1980) (declaring that civil action for perjury
would promote endless litigation); Newin Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 37
N.Y.2d 211, 217, 333 N.E.2d 163, 166, 371 N.Y.S.2d 884, 889 (1975) (suggesting that civil
action for perjury would create endless litigation).
94. See supra note 93 (courts suggesting that civil actions for perjury would result in
flood of litigation).
95. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 374 n. 165. During the one hundred years that the Maine
statute that allows recovery for damages caused by perjury has existed, Maine's appellate
courts have heard only four appeals that involved the tort of perjury. Id.
96. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 14 § 870 (1964 & Supp. 1986). The Maine statute requires
a plaintiff to demonstrate that an adverse party has obtained a judgment against the plaintiff
due to the perjury of a witness introduced at trial by the adverse party. Id. The plaintiff also
must demonstrate that the defendant's perjury actually caused damage to the plaintiff. Id.
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for perjury meet the same burden of proof as that demanded for the tort
of deceit may deter frivolous lawsuits. 97 A plaintiff in Oklahoma must prove
not only that the defendant perjured but also that he suffered detriment
due to the deception that the witness practiced on the trier of fact.98 One
commentator has suggested that to recover for the tort of perjury the
plaintiff must be able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant's perjury in the previous action resulted in monetary damages to
the plaintiff and that the perjured testimony proximately caused the plain-
tiff's monetary damages. 99 Thus, by imposing a high standard of proof,
courts and legislatures could prevent frivolous lawsuits brought under the
guise of a perjury action.'00
A final justification for the common law rule against civil actions for
perjury is that the rule encourages witnesses to testify in court.' 0' The
common law rule of witness immunity provides a witness with an absolute
privilege from subsequent suits for any relevant testimony that the witness
offered in court. 0 2 The witness immunity rule encourages witnesses to come
forward and testify fully, freely, and honestly about the matters in issue
without fear of later legal harassment. 0 3 Courts, however, do not serve the
97. See Copeland, 707 P.2d at 568-69 (establishing civil action for perjury in Oklahoma).
In Copeland, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that a plaintiff must show that false
testimony was a material misrepresentation parallel to the misrepresenataion that the Oklahoma
legislature had defined in the Oklahoma tort of deceit. Id. at 569; see also OKLA. STAT. 76,
§ 3 (Oklahoma statute defining tort of deceit). The Copeland court also required a plaintiff
to establish that the witness intended to deceive the trier of fact, and that the defendant's
perjured testimony actually harmed the plaintiff. Copeland, 707 P.2d. at 569; see supra notes
44-48 and accompanying text (discussing Copeland court's standard of proof for tort of
perjury).
98. See Copeland, 707 P.2d at 569 (requiring that defendant's perjured testimony
proximately cause plaintiff's harm); supra note 97 (discussing Copeland court's definition of
tort of perjury).
99. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 372-73 (requiring plaintiff to show by clear and convincing
evidence that defendant's false testimony harmed plaintiff).
100. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (suggesting that high standard of proof
for tort of perjury would prevent flood of litigation)
101. See, e.g., Rudow v. City of New York, 642 F.Supp. 1456, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(citing common law doctrine that provides immunity from subsequent civil liability for use of
perjured testimony to parties testifying in judicial proceeding); Hokanson v. Lichtor, 626 P.2d
214, 219 (Kan.App.1981) (discussing public policy that supports privilege of witness' testimony
during judicial proceeding); Andrews v. Steinberg, 122 Misc. 2d 468, 475, 471 N.Y.S.2d 764,
770 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1983) (declaring that absolute privilege attaches to testimony in judicial
proceedings that encourages witness cooperation).
102. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 366-69. Courts grant to any witness an absolute privilege
from subsequent law suits who gives any relevant testimony or other material to the court..
Id. at 367. The rule of witness immunity applies to all testimony, whether or not the witness
had testified maliciously, and regardless of whether the information was truthful. Id.
103. See id. at 366-69. Courts have determined that subsequent law suits may hinder the
administration of justice if courts did not grant civil immunity to a witness' pleading,
depositions, and courtroom testimony. Id. at 367.; see, e.g., Charles v. Wade, 665 F2d 661,
666 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that insulating witness from threat of civil liability for his testimony
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public policies that support the witness immunity rule by denying a victim
an opportunity to seek redress from a dishonest and untruthful witness.1
°4
Courts define perjury as the giving of false testimony with knowlege that
the statements were false. 105 The intent to commit perjury, without excuse
or justification, should transform privileged conduct into a tortious act.1 6
Courts that refuse to grant a civil remedy for perjury due to the witness
immunity rule, therefore, unnecessarily deny compensation to an injured
party.07 A civil action in tort would not undermine a witness' privilege to
give relevant truthful testimony because truthful testimony would not fall
within the tort. 08 Courts that refuse to grant a civil remedy for perjury due
to the witness immunity rule unnecessarily deny compensation to an injured
party.0 9
To avoid the common law rule against civil actions, plaintiffs occasion-
ally have used alternative actions in tort to recover damages in which perjury
was an element of the cause of action."0 For example, in Morgan v.
Graham,"' the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
would serve factfinding process), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1426 (1983).; Nichols v. Alker, 231
F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring) (agreeing that civil action for perjury may
tend to induce honest witnesses not to testify), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); Brewer v.
Carolina Coach Co., 253 N.C. 257, 261-62, 116 S.E.2d 725, 727-28 (1960) (stating that civil
action for perjury would give great leverage to litigants to intimidate witnesses).
104. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text (suggesting that civil action for
perjury would not militate against witness immunity rule).
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining perjury
as knowingly making a false statement under oath).
106. See Andrews v. Steinberg, 471 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. 1983). In Andrews v. Steinberg,
the plaintiff, an attorney, alleged that a former client intentionally and maliciously gave false
testimony about the plaintiff in a prior proceeding. Andrew v. Steinberg, 471 N.Y.S.2d at
766-67. The Andrews court determined that the witness made the statements in a judicial
proceeding and, therefore, the statements were privileged under the witness immunity rule. Id.
at 770. Reluctantly applying the witness immunity rule, the Andrews court noted that the
defendant escaped liability only because the defendant made the statements in a judicial
proceeding. Id. The Andrews court declared that the plaintiff unquestionably would have
stated a cause of action for damages if the defendant had not made the statements during a
judicial proceeding. Id.
107. See Andrews, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 770. The Andrews court noted that courts would
undermine the public policy of encouraging witnesses to testify if courts interpreted the witness
immunity rule to shield perjurious testimony and to deny a plaintiff an opportunity to seek
redress. Id. at 761. The Andrews court, however, also noted that a criminal conviction
demonstrates that the defendant witness had abused the privilege afforded by the witness
immunity rule. Id. at 772. Rather than mechanically applying the witness immunity rule, the
Andrews court suggested that a court should allow a civil action for perjury if a court had
convicted the defendant of perjury in a previous proceeding. Id.
108. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 367. The rule of witness immunity has its primary
application in preventing suits for libel and defamation. Id.
109. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (suggesting that witness immunity
rule should not prevent civil actions for tort of perjury).
110. See infra 111-137 and accompanying text (discussing alternative remedies in tort that
involve perjury).
111. 228 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1956).
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considered whether perjury may establish an element of a plaintiff's fraud
claim.112 In Morgan, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant
for damages caused by testimonial perjury."1 The defendant, president of
an insurance company, falsely had denied that the negligent driver of an
automobile who had injured the plaintiff in an accident did not have an
insurance policy with the company. 14 Relying on the defendant's perjured
affidavit and testimony, the plaintiff accepted a nonsuit rather than fully
pursuing his legal remedy against the insurance company."1 While declaring
that no civil action existed for damages due to perjury, the Tenth Circuit
held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action for fraud and
allowed the recovery of damages.
11 6
In addition to perjury as an element of fraud, courts have recognized
other alternatives in tort that include the perpetration of perjury as an
element."1 For instance, a plaintiff may use the commission of perjury as
an element in seeking to establish a claim for malicious prosecution." 8 In
Wright v. Yurko, 119 the District Court of Appeal of Florida (Fifth District)
determined that although there existed no civil action for perjury in Florida,
the plaintiff had established an action for malicious prosecution against the
defendant.12 0 In Wright, the defendant previously had filed a malpractice
claim against the plaintiff.12 ' The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
112. Morgan v. Graham, 228 F.2d at 627-28.
113. Id. at 626.
114. Id. In Morgan v. Graham, the plaintiff suffered injuries due to an automobile
accident with Godfrey W. Cochran who was the negligent driver of the automobile that caused
the accident. Morgan, 228 F.2d at 626. The plaintiff obtained a default against Cochran in
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. Id. The plaintiff suspected that
Cochran had an outstanding insurance policy with Moral Insurance Company at the time of
the accident and subsequently initiated a suit against the insurance company. Id. The president
of the insurance company, however, filed an affidavit stating that Cochran never had a policy
with the company. Id.
115. Id. In Morgan, the plaintiff did not have access to the negligent driver's insurance
policy and could not prove that the defendant's insurance policy ever existed. Id. The plaintiff,
therefore, voluntarily took a nonsuit. Id. Seven months later, however, the plaintiff learned
that the negligent driver's insurance policy existed after the insurance company became
insolvent. Id. The plaintiff then sued the president of the insurance company individually for
fraud. Id.
116. Id. at 627. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Morgan
determined that the sworn affidavit of the president of Moral Insurance Company was false
and that the president gave the perjured affidavit with the intent to deceive and defraud the
plaintiff. Id. The Tenth Circuit also determined that the plaintiff had relied to his detriment
upon the affidavit. Id. at 628. Stating that the action sounded in tort, the Tenth Circuit
permitted the recovery of punitive damages as well as compensatory damages. Id.
117. See infra notes 118-36 and accompanying text (discussing other alternative tort
remedies that may include perjury as element of tort).
118. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (discussing perjury as element of
malicious prosecution claim).
119. 446 So. 2d 1162 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984)
120. Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d at 1165.
121. Id. at 1164. In Wright v. Yurko, a jury had found for the plaintiff in the defendant's
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given false testimony with the intent to injure the plaintiff and subsequently
instituted a suit for malicious prosecution.'2 To establish an action for
malicious prosecution, the Wright court stated that the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant had initiated a civil proceeding against the
plaintiff with malice and without probable cause, and that the court had
terminated the previous proceeding in favor of the plaintiff.'23 After finding
that the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently stated a claim for malicious pros-
ecution, the Wright court permitted the plaintiff to seek monetary damages
due to the defendant's interference with the plaintiff's medical practice.
24
Another court has held that a plaintiff has established an action in tort
if the adverse party fraudulently obtains a judgment by procuring witnesses
to give perjured testimony.'21 In Stevens v.Brown'26 the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina permitted a plaintiff to
maintain a civil action arising from an alleged conspiracy to convict the
plaintiff using false testimony. 27 In Stevens, the plaintiff claimed that several
police officers conspired to give false testimony to procure the plaintiff's
murder conviction.'2 The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages for the
defendants' perjury and the defendants appealed.'2 On appeal, the district
court in Stevens declared that under North Carolina law civil liability does
not exist for damages resulting from perjury in a criminal trial. 30 The
Stevens court, however, noted that a conspiracy to convict using false
testimony was actionable in North Carolina. 3' Although recognizing a civil
previous malpractice claim. Id. The plaintiff subsequently brought suit alleging that the
defendant initiated the previous malpractice action with malice and intent to injure the plaintiff.
Id. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant conspired to give, and subsequently gave,
perjured testimony at the trial with the intent to injure the plaintiff. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1165. The Wright court, however, noted that if the plaintiff had failed to
plead properly any one of the elements of the malicious prosecution action, then the court
would have dismissed the suit. Id.
124. Id. at 1167.
125. See infra notes 126-133 (discussing case in which perjury was element of conspiracy).
126. 546 F.Supp 368 (C.D.N.C. 1983).
127. Stevens v. Brown, 546 F.Supp. at 369-70.
128. Id. at 369. In Stevens v. Brown a jury had found the plaintiff guilty of first degree
murder in a previous criminal proceeding. Id. The plaintiff, however, alleged that the police
officers had met with the district attorney before the trial and had conspired to convict the
plaintiff using perjured statements. Id.
129. Id. The trial court in Stevens v. Brown declared that the defendants had violated
the plaintiff's civil rights by conspiring to have the plaintiff arrested, prosecuted, and convicted
for murder using false testimony. Id. The trial court assessed damages at $9,000.00 against
three of the defendants. Id.
130. Id. at 370. In addition to declaring that civil liability did not exist for perjury, the
Stevens court declared that no liability existed for the inducement of perjury. Id. The Stevens
court, however, found that the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
stated a claim against the defendants for conspiring to convict the plaintiff with perjured
testimony. Id.
131. Id. at 370. The Stevens court noted that courts should encourage free testimony in
criminal cases. Id. Because police officers testify frequently in criminal cases, the Stevens court
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action for conspiracy, the district court found that the plaintiff failed to
prove the conspiracy or demonstrate that the officers' testimony was incon-
sistent with the evidence. 3 2 Accordingly, the Stevens court set aside the
plaintiff's judgment against the defendants.
133
The decision of the Stevens court departs from the decisions of courts
in the majority of American jurisdictions which maintain that a conspiracy
to commit perjury is not actionable because perjury itself is not tortious.'
34
Although tort theories other than a civil action for perjury may offer relief
to injured parties, the remedies are available only in certain factual circum-
stances. 35 Each of the tort remedies has separate elements in addition to
perjury that a plaintiff must establish before recovering damages. 3 6 Because
courts aim the other tort remedies at redressing other types of tortious
conduct, the alternative tort remedies often do not redress the injuries
caused solely by perjury.37
Although the alternative tort remedies often are inadequate or unavail-
able to a victim of perjured testimony, a plaintiff could seek relief under
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) . 31 Section 60(b)(3) authorizes a
motion for relief upon the grounds of perjury or fraud if the injured party
discovers the false testimony within one year from the judgment. 3 9 To
emphasized the need for police officers to testify freely in a judicial proceeding without the
fear of subsequent actions against them. Id. The Stevens court, however, stressed that courts
would serve no public policy by protecting witnesses from liability for damages caused by a
successful conspiracy to procure a conviction using false testimony rather than from the false
testimony itself. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 371.
134. See, e.g., Hokanson v. Lichtor, 626 P.2d 214, 218 (Kan.App. 1981) (stating that no
civil action for damages exists for either perjury or conspiracy to commit perjury); Stolte v.
Blackstone, 213 Neb. 113, -, 328 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Neb. 1982) (declaring that perjury
itself is not actionable and, therefore, plaintiff cannot make perjury subject of actionable
conspiracy); W. G. Platts v. Platts, 73 Wash.2d 434, 440, 438 P.2d 867, 871 (1968) (stating
that plaintiff's claim of conspiracy to commit perjury was not actionable).
135. See supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text (discussing facts of fraud claim
involving perjury); notes 118-124 (malicious prosecution that includes perjury as element);
notes 125-133 (perjury as element of conspiracy action).
136. See supra note 135 (noting requisite factual circumstances for fraud claims based on
perjury).
137. See supra notes 110-33 and accompanying text (examples of courts applying other
tort remedies that include perjury as element).
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (providing relief from judgment that defendant obtained
by fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of adverse party); infra notes 139-144 and
accompanying text (discussing remedies available under federal rule 60(b)(3)).
139. See FED R. CIrv. P. 60(b)(3) (1985). Rule 60(b)(3) provides that a court may relieve
a party from a final judgment obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by
an adverse party. Id. Rule 60(b)(3) also provides that the fraud may be either intrinsic or
extrinsic. Id.; see F. JAmis & G. HAzARD, Cvn. PROCEDURE § 12.14 (3d 1985). "Intrinsic
fraud" includes the use of perjured testimony or forged evidentiary documents. Id. "Extrinsic
fraud" includes bribery of the judge or jury, and fraudulenty inducing a party not to appear
in court. Id.
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maintain a motion for equitable relief under the rule for perjured testimony,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the perjury prevented a full and fair
consideration of all relevant facts. 4
While permitting courts to rescind a judgment obtained by fraud or
perjury, the rule limits relief to situations in which the plaintiff can attribute
the alleged perjury to the adverse party.' 41 If the perjurer is not a party to
the original action relief is unavailable to the injured party.1 42 Another
limitation of relief under the rule is a one-year limitation period for plaintiffs
alleging fraud or perjury. 4 1 If a plaintiff does prevail on a motion under
the rule, however, a court may vacate an erroneous judgment and impose
the duty of restitution upon the party charged with fraud.
44
Neither the alternative common law remedies nor the enactment of rule
60(b)(3) adequately redress plaintiffs injured solely by the commission of
perjury. 45 A tort action similar to that in Copeland, however, permits a
court to compensate a victim for all injuries proximately caused by perjured
testimony.' 46 Because the commission of perjury is an intentional act com-
mitted with malice, courts also could award punitive damages to an injured
plaintiff. 47 Moreover, if a court will not vacate a judgment, a tort remedy
for perjury will be the only means to compensate the plaintiff for his
injuries.
140. See J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.24[5] (2d ed. 1985).
A court should not presume fraud, misrepresntation, or other misconduct. Id. The moving
party must prove by clear and convincing evidence each allegation against the adverse party.
Id.
141. See id. Federal rule 60(b)(3) clearly states that a court may relieve a party from a
final judgment because of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party
only. Id. Federal rule 60(b)(3) does not provide relief, however, if a witness has given perjured
testimony and the party who obtained the judgment was completely innocent and the inde-
pendent fraud was material. Id. Although a judgment procured by the perjury of an independent
third person is unjust, courts cannot grant relief pursuant to rule 60(b)(3). Id.
142. See id. (rule 60(b)(3) limiting plaintiff's relief only to adverse party).
143. See FED. R. Cv. P. 60(b)(6) (providing that plaintiffs must make motion for relief
within one year); F. JAs & G. H.zzn, supra note 139, at §12.14. Rule 60(b)(3) allows a
court to set aside a judgment within one year on the basis of fraud whether the fraud is
intrinsic or extrinsic. Id.
144. See Eagle, supra note 1, at 361-62 (discussing disadvantages of obtaining relief under
rule 60(b)(3) for perjury). A disadvantage of federal rule 60(b)(3) is the inadequacy of restitution
as a remedy for perjury or fraud. Id. at 361. Restitution under rule 60(b)(3) entities a person
suffering loss due to perjury to recover the defendant's unjust enrichment. Id. Although
restitution may provide a recovery, it may not compensate adequately the victim for all of his
damages. Id. at 362. Because courts measure a plaintiff's restitution proceeds based on one
party's unjust enrichment at the other party's expense, the injured party may recover only the
amount that the court gave the adverse party pursuant to the decree. Id.
145. See supra notes 110-44 and accompanying text (analysis of other tort remdies as
adequate redress for perjury).
146. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text ( Copeland court recognizing civil
action in tort for perjury).
147. See supra MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining
perjury as knowingly making false statement under oath).
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Perjury is a voluntary and intentional wrong.148 When an adverse party
willfully and maliciously has committed an act that harms another, courts
should award the victim damages for all injuries proximately caused by the
adverse party's act.1 49 Courts, however, traditionally have denied compen-
sation to plaintiffs injured by perjury. 50 In Copeland v. Anderson, however,
the Oklahoma Court of Appeals recognized a civil action for damages
caused by perjury.' 5' By recognizing a civil actioh in tort for perjury, the
Copeland court has provided a remedy that will compensate completely and
consistently a victim of perjury. 5 2 Like the Copeland court, other courts
should realize that the common law justifications underlying the rule against
a civil action do not support the mechanical denial of a civil action to
victims injured by an adverse party's perjury.13 Courts also should realize
that the alternative tort remedies and rule 60(b)(3) often provide inadequate
redress to a victim of perjury.
5 4
In addition to courts, legislatures should consider a statutory cause of
action for the tort of perjury. 5 5 Legislatures should impose a high standard
of proof similar to the standard in the Maine perjury statute and the
Copeland case. 156 A prospective perjury statute should permit civil actions
for perjury only against an adverse party or a witness that the adverse party
introduced at trial.1 57 The statute should require that the plaintiff demon-
strate that he suffered actual monetary damage proximately caused by the
defendant's perjured testimony. 58 Like the Maine perjury statute, legislatures
should also require that the plaintiff commence his perjury action within
148. See id.
149. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 870 (1977) (person who commits intentional act to
cause harm to another should be liable to victim for damages caused by act).
150. See supra notes 1 & 20 and accompanying text (citing courts that follow common
law rule and deny civil action in tort for perjury).
151. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text (discussing Oklahoma Supreme Court
decision's in Copeland to recognize civil action in tort for perjury).
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 71-109 (discussing reasonableness of justifications for common law
rule against civil actions for perjury).
154. See supra notes 110-37 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts aim alternative
tort remedies at other types of tortious conduct, not at injuries caused solely by perjury); 137-
44 and accompanying text (discussing limitations and inadequacies of rule 60(b)(3) as remedy
for perjury).
155. See infra notes 156-158 and accompanying text (discussing prospective perjury statute).
156. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing standard of proof in
Copeland and Maine perjury statute).
157. ME. REv. STAT. 14 § 870 (1964 & Supp. 1986) (providing perjury cause of action
only against adverse party or witness introduced by adverse party); see supra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text (examining Maine perjury statute).
158. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (suggesting that high standard of proof
would deter frivolous law suits); see also Eagle, supra note 1, at 373 (declaring that high
standard of proof would prevent fraud). Because the tort of perjury has high potential for
abuse and results in reopening of prior litigation, courts should disallow suits that do not
allege pecuniary or tangible damage. Id. at 373 n.152.
[Vol. 44:1257
LYING ON THE STAND
three years after the adverse judgment." 9 A concern for providing adequate
relief to victims of intentional harm should encourage both courts and state
legislatures to re-examine the common law rule against a civil action for
perjury and consider a civil action in tort for perjury.
JonN R. ALFoRD, JR.
159. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 14 § 870 (1964 & Supp. 1986) (requiring that plaintiff bring
action within three years of adverse judgment); see supra note 143 and accompanying text
(suggesting that rule 60(b)'s one-year limitations period is another obstacle to plaintiffs alleging
perjury).
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